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Random Drug Testing

RANDOM DRUG TESTING
Random drug testing coexists uneasily with a general
Fourth Amendment right to be free of suspicionless
government searches. Typically, a governmental search is
accompanied by a warrant supported by individualized
suspicion, that is, probable cause. Random drug testing
involves a search without any particularized suspicion that

the subject of the search has used drugs. The Supreme
Court has justified random drug testing, ruling that when
the government has special needs to search apart from law
enforcement, the warrant requirement does not apply and
the only constitutional requirement is that the search be
reasonable. Whether a search is reasonable depends on
weighing the search's intrusion on the subject's privacy
interest against the government's interests in the

suspicionless search. The Court has tended to approve:;_
random drug testing programs instigated by the govern..::
ment by minimizing the privacy intrusion occasioned b -':;
•""h
,
y
d maxim1z1ng t e governments apparent
the searchan
interest in the suspicionless search.
The Supreme Court has addressed random dru
testing in various contexts, including with respect
sensitive government employment, private employment
subject to government safety regulation, requirements to
run for public office, and eligibility to participate in extracurricular activities in public schools. In the cases before the Court, random drug testing was used variously to
detect drugs, to ensure the absence of drug use, or to deter
drug use. Justifications for random drug testing have included claims that a harm may have occurred because of
drug use, a harm could occur as a result of drug use, or
that drug use is incompatible with an activity engaged in

t~

by the group subject to testing. The Court has not
deemed random drug testing to be subject to a specific
test. It has relied on the general umbrella of reasonableness
to endorse or reject a random drug testing policy.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND RANDOM
DRUG TESTING
The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." The amendment applies directly to the
federal government and indirectly to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, it applies to searches
conducted by those acting as agents of the government or
instruments of government policy. For example, not only
was a railroad company's testing of employees pursuant to
statutory command deemed a search for Fourth Ainendment purposes, so was a test pursuant to the "government's
encouragement, endorsement, and participation" (Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S.
[1989]). However, the amendment does not apply to private parties acting out of purely private concerns.
The Court has consistently concluded that random
drug tests, be they tests of blood, urine or breath,
searches for Fourth Amendment purposes. The collection
of the samples involves a search, as does the analysis of the
Via/,s used to collect urine for drug and alcohol testing.
samples. However, the Fourth Amendment only
Seattle, Washington, April 16. 2004. The constitutionality of
unreasonable searches. The Court has determined that
random drug testing has challenged the Supreme Court to find a
amendment's suggestion that warrants supported by
balance between protecting citizens from unreasonable searches
picion of wrongdoing (e.g., probable cause) are the
with the need to guard the general public against accidents caused
ome of reasonableness is most relevant to criminal cases.
by workers under the influence ofdrugs. Citing the need for public
When the government has special needs to search that
safery, the court has generally accepted the necessiry of random
unrelated to normal law enforcement concerns, the G<JlifL. x>.C
drug testing, despite the intrusion into an individual's right to
dispenses with the warrant requirement. Whether such
privacy. RON WURZER/GETTY IMAGES
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Random Drug Testing

suspicionlcss search is reasonable depends on the balancing of the legitimate interests of the government represented by the search with the individual's Fourth
Amendtnent-based rights.

GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN RANDOM
DRUG TESTING
The Court appears willing to find a significant government
interests supporting random drug testing whenever the
govern111cnt has a sensible reason to test. The issue is not
merely whether the government has a legitimate reason to
be concerned about drug use in a variety of circumstances.
The issue is whether that concern can be addressed by
allowing random drug tests when the government has no
reason to believe that a particular person, or possibly even
any person at all, has tal{en drugs. Given that the government's interest in suspicionless testing must outweigh the
intrusion on the privacy interests of the subjects, the more
important the government's interest is deemed to be, the
more likely the random drug testing will be allowed.
In 1989, the Court allowed random drug testing in
two cases. S/{inner involved federal regulations that required blood and urine tests of employees "involved in
certain train accidents," and authorized breath and urine
of "e1nployees who violate certain safety rules."
regulations were pron1ulgated pursuant to the Federal
Railroad Safety Act ofl970, in the context of an industryrecord of accidents and injuries stemming from onalcohol and drug use. National Treasury Employees
'nion v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), concerned
·quired urine tests for employees seel<lng transfer or
·omotion to positions involving drug interdiction or
1
sitions that require that the employee carry firearms,
<<°ough it did not appear that there was a historical
Joble1n of drug use involving the employees the Customs
ice sought to test. Both cases were based on significant
hlic safety concerns.
In 1995 and 2002, the Court allowed random drug
:~g in nvo publlc school cases. The Court authorized
·ng in Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
5), where a policy authorized random drug tests of
:ents participating in school athletics. There, the
'0 1 district was fighting a drug problem among stuts that appeared to be fueled by student athletes. Part
_e district's concern was that when drugs and athletics
_~d, an increased incidence of injury could occur
\~all competitors, including those not taking drugs.
~ourt also allowed random drug testing in Board of
'tion of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottae County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). There, the
board implemented a random drug testing policy
;;~tudents involved in extracurricular activities based
;>general concern regarding drug use among the
body. The Court allowed the program based on
c

the general concern for student health, even though there
appeared to be no reason to believe that the group that
was to be tested was particularly likely to have taken

drugs. The Court simply noted that, "we find that testing
students who participate in extracurricular activities is a
reasonably effective means of addressing the School District's legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring and
detecting drug use." It appears that the policy was deemed

reasonable in part because it helped deter all of the district's schoolchildren from tal<lng drugs, whether they
participated in extracurricular activity or not.
However, the Court voided the random drug testing

policy in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). The
program in that case required that candidates for certain
state offices certify that they had taken a negative urinalysis test within thirty days prior to qualifying for nomination or election. The Court concluded that the
structure of the testing indicated that it did not address a
special need, but merely a symbolic one. That interest was
not enough to outweigh the admittedly small privacy interest that was invaded.

RANDOM DRUG TESTING AND PRIVACY
INTERESTS
In approving a number of random drug testing programs,
the Court has suggested that the privacy interests implicated by random drug testing are significant. However, it
has found those privacy interests less significant than the
opposing governmental interests. The Court focuses on the
reasonable expectation of privacy of the person who is being
tested. However, in the process of evaluating the privacy
interests, the Court arguably diminishes them. Given that
privacy interests are balanced against government interests
as a part of a balancing test, mini1nizing the privacy rights
implicated will tend to lead to the approval of whatever
random drug test is at issue.
The Court has tended to find a general diminished
expectation of privacy for those who are subject to random drug tests, noting that those who are tested may have
a diminished expectation of privacy based on the very
activity that triggers the drug test. For example, in the
context of evaluating the random drug testing of railroad
workers after accidents, in Skinner, the Court indicated
that by taking a job in a highly regulated industry, workers
had a diminished expectation of privacy. The Court made
a similar finding in Von Raab, because U.S. Customs
Service workers might be involved in drug interdiction
and could carry weapons. In addition, the Court in Acton
and Earls indicated that student athletes and students
involved in extracurricular activities necessarily yielded
some of their privacy by participating in school activities
that would expose them to situations of communal undress. Nonetheless, even a lessened expectation of privacy
may still be invaded by random dmg testing.
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Random drug tests implicate a wide range of privacy
interests related to the collection of samples, the analysis
of the samples, and the dissemination of the results of the
testing. The collection of samples for testing cai1 physically and emotionally intrude on privacy rights. The
Court has considered the physical intrusion of breath and
blood tests, and found them minimal. However, the
Court has suggested that the privacy interests implicated
by the process of collecting urine samples can be significant, particularly given the reasonable expectation of privacy in excretory bodily functions. However, the Court
suggests that if the procedures used to monitor the act of
giving the urine sample are respectful of privacy and are
limited to guaranteeing that no tampering has occurred,
legitimate privacy interests will not be overwhelmingly
invaded. Indeed, the Court has suggested that being
monitored while producing a urine sample is similar to
urinating while in close proximity to others-a common
occurrence in a public bathrootn-and that privacy
interests are not significantly implicated as long as the
subject is fully clothed and monitored at a respectful
distance. The Court ignored or failed to recognize a difference in privacy interests between urinating while in
close proximity to others and being monitored while
producing a urine sample for a drug test.
In addition, the chemical analysis of the samples
qualifies as an additional search that intrudes on privacy
interests. Blood and urine can be tested for many different
substances that can reveal significant medical information.
Factors relevant to the reasonableness of the search include whether the testing program tests only for those
substances that are relevant to the concerns of those who
require the tests, whether private medical information
must be revealed in the course of the testing, and how
broadly test results will be disseminated. 1~he Court
appears to conceive of the privacy right as the right not to
have one's private medical conditions revealed, rather than
the general right to not have one's body fluids searched.
Given that the Court now deems a governmentordered blood test for drugs to be a negligible invasion of
privacy rights, it is fairly clear that the Court has sought to
minimize the right to be free of searches. It is this minimized right that is then weighed against the governments
interest in suspicionless testing.
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court's treatment of
random drug testing suggests a shift in how the Fourth
Atnendment applies to searches outside of the criminal
context or indicates that the Court is willing to provide as
many tools as possible for the government's fight against
drugs. The Court has made clear that a reasonable search is
a constitutional search and that it will determine what is
reasonable. In judging reasonableness, the Court has created a balancing test that weighs the random ·search's intrusion of privacy interests against the government's
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interest in the policy. However, it appears to have mini
mized the apparent intrusion on privacy rights and rnaxj~.
mized the apparent weight of government's interest iri'~
testing, with the result that random drug testing progr~·:
may be fairly easy to construct in a constitutional manner.
SEE ALSO Fourth Amendment; Privacy; Search and

Seizure
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RANKING THE JUSTICES
Between 1928 and 2004, there were twelve major studies
that proposed rankings of U.S. Supretne Court justicesi
including those compiled by justices Charles Evans
Hughes (1928) and Felix Frankfurter (1957) and those by
Roscoe Pound (1938), John P. Frank (1958),
Currie (1964), Stuart Nagel (1970), Sidney Asch
Albert Blaustein and Roy Mersky (1972, updated
William Ross [1996]), Bernard Schwartz (1979), James
Hambleton (1983), Robert Bradley (2003), and
Comiskey (2004). In his 1996 article "The Ratings
Game," William Ross remarks that far from merely
a parlor game, these rankings have elucidated the qual!1:1es
of Supreme Court justices that are valued by Americans
(p. 402). In addition to producing a list of the greatest
justices, Bernard Schwartz also compiled a list of the ten
worst justices, whom he calls "Supreme Court failures,"
his 1997 Book of Legal Lists.

METHODOLOGIES
Most of the rankings were made on the basis of each·,
compiler's individual evaluation (Hughes 1928; Pound
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